Security for Static Websites

Following our recent release to more easily protect Single Page Applications (SPA) and static websites, we wanted to deep dive with you on the matter.

“I have a lot to tell you. Do you remember the 90’s? You know, people were talking about serving static HTML with Apache, and singing about the glorious future of JavaScript, and forming startups?

“There’s a place where that idea still exists as a reality. And I’ve been there.”

“Where is it?”

“Static websites.”

“Like the JAMstack?”

“Yeah. The dream of the 90’s is alive in the JAMstack.”


So, you’ve bought into the dream, and now you’re building static websites with React or Vue, and you’re deploying them on bare-metal servers or even Netlify.

Awesome.

But.

There’s a problem with the dream

There are two main reasons people are telling us to move to static websites: Speed, and security. There’s no doubt about the speed; but I’m here to talk security.

When we’re only dealing with static HTML, with no JavaScript, no interactivity, it’s true that the result is inherently more secure than a dynamically-served alternative.

But we’re not children playing with toys, we’re building production applications with modern JS frameworks and APIs. We still use templating engines, we still write to a database. It will always remain true that our web application is the front door to the user data we need to protect.

More to the point, frameworks like Vue are still vulnerable to a range of cross-site scripting attacks. And doing anything really interesting still requires accessing a backend API via AJAX—so you still need security on your backend, and on those remote connections too.

What are we to do? There’s still a lot of work ahead of us to secure our web application thoroughly, but the first step is to start looking at how we can enlist browsers to help us—which means understanding how attackers can exploit front-end vulnerabilities.

The good news is that we can prevent these vulnerabilities with the judicious use of an HTTP response header. In fact, modern browsers offer (as we shall see) a very wide range of security features that are off by default, but that can be activated by your webserver via HTTP response headers.

In this article, we’re going to talk about

  • Cross-site scripting (XSS)
  • Clickjacking and framebusting
  • Man in the Middle (MitM) and domain hijacking
  • Referrer leakage

Referrer Leakage

Let’s start with an easy case. Suppose your cool web app uses an API key to authorize user actions. Let’s suppose moreover that your users can (and do) pass that key in as a query parameter. So maybe they access a feature on your website with a URL like https://my-cool-webapp.io/?api-key=foobar.

Now, let us suppose that said user then clicks on a link to an external website, perhaps one operated by an adversary. Among the headers that their browser will send that external webserver is the Referer (sic) header, which will look like this:

Referer: https://my-cool-webapp.io/?api-key=foobar 

And…just like that, the adversarial web server has a perfectly valid API key. Crap.

(This is perhaps an overly dramatic example; but it will do to make the point. You can imagine lots of perfectly reasonable things to send via query parameters that you’d prefer to keep secret.)

In this case, the response header we’re after is called Referrer-Policy. This header provides instructions to the browsers on when and how to construct the Referer request header, and offers a great deal of fine-grained control. The most important values to consider, however, are these:

  • no-referrer-when-downgrade — this is the browser default; without going into detail, it’s not a great option.
  • no-referrer — never send the referrer header. Absolute safest option, but it kills your own visibility to track users across your app from your server logs.
  • same-origin — never send the referrer header, except to pages on the same domain, i.e. only sends the referrer header to sites under your control.
  • origin — This option tells the browser to strip out query parameters and path information, leaving only the hostname.
  • origin-when-cross-origin — Same as origin, but leaves parameter details intact when visiting sites on the same page.

Depending on what you need from Referer (sic) headers, same-origin or no-referrer are your safest, but most restrictive, options.

Clickjacking

Have you ever visited a suspicious website, and later realized that you’ve somehow liked a bunch of posts on Facebook you’ve never seen before? If so, you’ve witnessed a clickjacking attack.

The basic idea behind clickjacking is to render invisible inline frames (iframes) over tantalizing click targets. When you go to click on that enticing “download free now!” button, you actually end up clicking on the invisible inline frame, which then redirects your action to something else entirely, such as liking Facebook posts, following Twitter accounts, or activating an Amazon affiliate link.

Clickjacking can occur in one of two ways. The first is if you include a hostile inline frame in your webpage. The second is when a malicious site masquerades as your site by rendering your site inside an inline frame on their site.

iframe sandboxes

The first case is straightforward to deal with. If you must use inline frames on your site, always load them into an iframe sandbox:

<iframe width="300" height="150" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-forms"></iframe>

By default, simply specifying a sandbox in the iframe tag will prevent the browsers from executing any scripts, or basically doing much of anything short of rendering styled HTML, in the inline frame. You can then opt in to additional behaviors, such as script execution, enabling browser APIs, allowing popups, and so forth.

Frame options

The other case, finding your site rendered into an iframe on a hostile site, is again readily handled by emitting the X-Frame-Options header to activate the security features of the browser to protect against this kind of malicious behavior.

This header instructs the browser whether it is permitted to render your page inside of an iframe tag, easy as that. There are only three options, presented here from safest to least safe:

  • DENY — never allow this page to be rendered inside an iframe tag, the safest option
  • SAMEORIGIN — only allow this page to be rendered inside iframe tags on the same site.
  • ALLOW-FROM — provide a whitelist of domains permitted to render this page in an iframe tag.

If you don’t use iframes to render parts of your site—and you probably shouldn’t without an extremely good reason—, then by all means set X-Frame-Options to DENY and be done with it.

Man in the Middle attacks

Pineapples. Yeah, they’re real. Any time your users connect to an open WiFi network, or even a closed network that isn’t trustworthy, they open themselves to Man in the Middle attacks. The idea is quite straightforward—the attacker pretends to be your website. And if they can earn the user’s trust (often not very difficult), they can do more or less anything that they like with that user’s account.

Encrypt everything

The first line of defense against this kind of attack is to encrypt all traffic to your website using TLS (aka HTTPS). If you aren’t doing that, there is nothing preventing a third party from listening in on your users, and there is nothing preventing a third party from pretending to be your site.

If you’re deploying to a dedicated static site hosting solution like Netlify, problem solved—they provide encryption free. If you aren’t, you can still easily get free TLS encryption using CloudFlare or Let’s Encrypt. On top of that, however, you should also stop serving your web app over non-encrypted connections.

Defeating pineapples

Nevertheless, in a pineapple scenario, an attacker might attempt to masquerade as your site, forcing an unencrypted connection. In that case, the Strict-Transport-Security header is your friend. This header instructs the browser not to connect over unencrypted connections; the downside is that the user will have needed to connect to your site over a legitimate connection at least once (although of course most will have, this is a minor downside, really).

The Strict-Transport-Security header has several options, separated by semi-colons:

  • max-age=[value] — for how long the browser should honor the header before checking for it again (in seconds)
  • includeSubdomains — are subdomains included as part of this policy? (Default is no)
  • preload — instructs the browser to inform the browser author to hardcode your site into the list of sites that should never be connected to over an insecure connection.

When you are first setting up this option, use a short max-age value, say 10 minutes, and do not use the preload option. Once you are satisfied that everything is working, then consider setting max-age to one year (31536000 seconds), and setting the preload directive to make it basically permanent.

Key pinning

Of course, pineapples can fake the cryptographic certificates that are used to encrypt websites. All modern browsers will inform users that they are connecting to a site with a dodgy security certificate—but let’s be honest, how many times have you just clicked through that warning? Your users certainly have.

Key pinning is a browser security feature that prevents attackers from using falsified security certificates to pose as your site. The idea is that you can tell the browser which security keys are allowed to encrypt traffic to your site, and the browser will reject any subsequent attempt to connect using one you haven’t explicitly authorized. Activate this feature with the Public-Key-Pins header, but be careful—misconfiguring this header can result in bricking your website!

Like the strict transport policy, there are several possible directives you can use to configure key pinning.

  • pin-sha256="[value]" — This specifies the SHA256 hash of a valid TLS key that is permitted to encrypt traffic to your site. You can (and should!) list multiple keys—if one key is revoked (or you mistype the hash!), and there are no fallbacks, your site will be bricked. So always set at least two valid keys in advance, just in case.
  • max-age=[value] — The duration, in seconds, that the key should remain pinned.
  • includeSubdomains — when present, indicates that the policy should affect all subdomains.

As before, begin with a very small value for max-age for testing, perhaps ten minutes (600 seconds). Only once you are comfortable that all of the keys you want to specify are working with the policy should you extend the max-age to something longer.

Cross site scripting

Cross site scripting, or XSS, is a kind of attack in which an attacker places malicious JavaScript into your webpage. This is often quite difficult to achieve, but when it happens, the results are quite devastating. Attackers can modify the DOM, access local storage and non-secure cookies, listen to user events, exfiltrate user data, and on and on. Fortunately, the browser is on our side, and we have a couple of tools out our disposal to help prevent XSS attacks

Take care when rendering templates

Prevention is key, as with many things. The easiest door to XSS is if an attacker can get a script tag into the DOM. So, don’t let attackers do that!

Never user innerHtml, but prefer textContent instead for making textual updates. Escape user-provided strings with a js library such as sanitize-html to transform “ to a harmless &lt;script&gt;. Load JSON content with JSON.parse() instead of eval(). Easy stuff.

Content security policy

The browser can help us here too. In the past, you could rely on the X-Xss-Protection header to instruct browsers to avoid running unsafe JavaScript. However this header is deprecated, and it is not supported in (for example) Firefox.

The better solution is to use a Content Security Policy or CSP. In broad terms, a CSP is a set of whitelists that tell browsers which domains are trusted for serving different kinds of content. CSPs are very fine-grained: You can specify independent sources for fonts, style, scripts, APIs, and a lot more.

The Content-Security-Policy header is used to specify a CSP. However, because CSPs can be quite complex to configure, the CSP definition was designed to make it easy to use an external tool to help configure it. In fact, Sqreen now provides support for configuring CSPs (and other security headers!) for static websites. I strongly advise using a dedicated tool to craft your CSP (Sqreen is free to get started).

Conclusion

Even static websites have security issues that must be carefully attended to. The good news is the browser is our friend—we just need to tell it what we want. You should be setting all of the following HTTP response headers when serving static webpages to enable these features:

  • Referrer-Policy
  • X-Frame-Options
  • Strict-Transport-Security
  • Public-Key-Pins
  • X-XSS-Protection
  • Content-Security-Policy

Nearly all hosting providers should provide a mechanism for setting these headers. If they don’t, you should request that they do support them, or you should seriously consider moving to a site that does. (Warning: GitHub Pages does NOT permit setting these headers!)

And of course if you need help making the right decisions on how to configure these headers, especially the Content Security Policy, Sqreen is your friend.